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SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains — arXiv:2610.31814
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-26T19:54:39.600Z
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How to cite
SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains — arXiv:2610.31814 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6ec6fd1ee710 (Metraipolis archive dc_6ec6fd1ee710, sha256 cc4d9f813fc1ee5af5cc2cd38a4d81f5aaacbe25aa685e51b8df6d6db3df0068)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6ec6fd1ee710,
title = {SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains — arXiv:2610.31814},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6ec6fd1ee710; sha256 cc4d9f813fc1ee5af5cc2cd38a4d81f5aaacbe25aa685e51b8df6d6db3df0068},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector $\alpha = A\,e(m)$ and each verifier holds a secret functional $c_i = \Gamma^T \lambda(x_i)$ derived from virtual anchors $\Gamma$ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to $\omega$ verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most $Q/q + 1/(q-1)$, a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for $t < n/3$, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size $32(\omega+1)$ bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on $n$. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.DC, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Information Theory (cs.IT); Quantum Physics (quant-ph). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-26T19:46:03.302Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.DC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).