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Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification — arXiv:2608.10478

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10478
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T06:47:57.040Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
dc9602780facec56f9a07f42e83ea5de6480e12cd92e9c29e0e153efdf07c65e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6e5300bd951a

How to cite

Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification — arXiv:2608.10478 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10478 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6e5300bd951a (Metraipolis archive dc_6e5300bd951a, sha256 dc9602780facec56f9a07f42e83ea5de6480e12cd92e9c29e0e153efdf07c65e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6e5300bd951a,
  title = {Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification — arXiv:2608.10478},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10478},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6e5300bd951a; sha256 dc9602780facec56f9a07f42e83ea5de6480e12cd92e9c29e0e153efdf07c65e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10478. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

A principal seeks to allocate $k$ identical objects among n sequentially arriving, impatient agents. Each agent privately observes her valuation, and the principal's payoff from allocating an object depends on the recipient's valuation. The principal can perfectly verify the valuation of at most $m$ agents, where $m < k$, and commits to a mechanism before any agent arrives. We characterize the class of optimal mechanisms. Our main result establishes that, in states where the number of remaining objects exceeds the number of available verification checks, the optimal mechanism may involve probabilistic verification.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-12 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10478 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T06:41:34.684Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-12?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).