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General-Sum Linear Regulator Games for Positive Systems — arXiv:2608.22711
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22711
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T08:25:42.802Z
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General-Sum Linear Regulator Games for Positive Systems — arXiv:2608.22711 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22711 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6bf40bd7bca7 (Metraipolis archive dc_6bf40bd7bca7, sha256 d7a7c7e4c0ca48d3d5d38a214ed641252791c2c562d2e1602ca50b9740bf1993)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6bf40bd7bca7,
title = {General-Sum Linear Regulator Games for Positive Systems — arXiv:2608.22711},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22711},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6bf40bd7bca7; sha256 d7a7c7e4c0ca48d3d5d38a214ed641252791c2c562d2e1602ca50b9740bf1993},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22711. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper studies a continuous-time general-sum non-cooperative game with linear costs, positive linear system dynamics, and elementwise linear input constraints. In the finite-horizon case, we present a verification theorem characterizing feedback Nash equilibria, in terms of absolutely continuous solutions of a coupled system of vector-valued ordinary differential equations, realized by time-varying feedback laws. Unlike linear-quadratic differential games, whose Riccati-based equilibria scale quadratically with the state dimension, this formulation scales linearly. However, the resulting piecewise-constant feedback saturates between its constraint bounds rather than varying smoothly, and additional mathematical challenges arise when characterizing the solutions of the differential equations, which are generally discontinuous due to the switching nature of the feedback gains. In this work, we study the case where switching occurs only at isolated time instants. In the infinite-horizon case, under stabilizability assumptions, the equilibrium is characterized by coupled vector-valued algebraic equations. For this game, we propose iterative methods to compute both finite and infinite-horizon equilibria. The approach is illustrated through a large-scale pollution game. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-25 in math.OC). Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC) ; Systems and Control (eess.SY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22711 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T08:18:05.699Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-08-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).