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New Approaches to Strategic Thinking in Dynamic Games — arXiv:2609.21163

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21163
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T03:11:50.379Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
a572898ceb9a13d479f12fcb3c46ee7e5c0d268d67bb4927ba13d1a9eff15b66
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6b4def59345a

How to cite

New Approaches to Strategic Thinking in Dynamic Games — arXiv:2609.21163 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21163 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6b4def59345a (Metraipolis archive dc_6b4def59345a, sha256 a572898ceb9a13d479f12fcb3c46ee7e5c0d268d67bb4927ba13d1a9eff15b66)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6b4def59345a,
  title = {New Approaches to Strategic Thinking in Dynamic Games — arXiv:2609.21163},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21163},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6b4def59345a; sha256 a572898ceb9a13d479f12fcb3c46ee7e5c0d268d67bb4927ba13d1a9eff15b66},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21163. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We present several models of strategic choice concerning equilibrium reasoning and behaviour, as well as new applications to dynamic games. We propose concepts such as historical equilibrium, simple Nash equilibrium, cautious backward induction, and an approach inspired by how chess players reason in sequential games.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-21 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21163 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T02:58:00.351Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).