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Suspicious Perfection: Rating Rewards, Credibility Inversion, and Information Loss — arXiv:2608.24062

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24062
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T07:34:49.212Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
8e0322a1ac2e70c875c4aebd89fece4ef03a52a32497ec6ae1efadd44da46dec
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6a2e93469bca

How to cite

Suspicious Perfection: Rating Rewards, Credibility Inversion, and Information Loss — arXiv:2608.24062 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24062 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6a2e93469bca (Metraipolis archive dc_6a2e93469bca, sha256 8e0322a1ac2e70c875c4aebd89fece4ef03a52a32497ec6ae1efadd44da46dec)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6a2e93469bca,
  title = {Suspicious Perfection: Rating Rewards, Credibility Inversion, and Information Loss — arXiv:2608.24062},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24062},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6a2e93469bca; sha256 8e0322a1ac2e70c875c4aebd89fece4ef03a52a32497ec6ae1efadd44da46dec},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24062. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Platforms use rating bonuses and badges to reward good sellers. When ratings can be inflated, stronger rewards can instead weaken the information available to buyers. We study an initially informative rating system in which sellers can pay to raise their displayed score and buyers rationally account for manipulation. Manipulation costs and returns are common across qualities conditional on the honest rating. Under this restriction, credibility can fail to increase between adjacent scores only where the higher score earns an additional reward. Our main result concerns large top-rating bonuses. Once sellers choose only between keeping their honest rating and reaching the top, a larger bonus makes the equilibrium rating system less informative in Blackwell's order along either extremal equilibrium selection. Lower scores retain their honest quality composition but become rarer. As the bonus grows, almost everyone displays the top score, its credibility approaches the population average, and the value of rating information vanishes. Nevertheless, a nearly perfect score can remain more credible than a perfect one. We derive the rate of information loss for exponential manipulation costs and establish a budget-feasible exposure rule that avoids credibility reversals. The results suggest that platform evaluations should examine rating frequencies together with category credibility. Rational buyer skepticism can correct the interpretation of ratings without recovering the distinctions that manipulation has erased.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24062 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T07:30:50.337Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).