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Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement — arXiv:2611.08366

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-06T14:43:42.969Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b4d5c259751d235b998154c820d409f1805feba41759196560de82ccc81976ab
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6935cdfc16db

How to cite

Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement — arXiv:2611.08366 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6935cdfc16db (Metraipolis archive dc_6935cdfc16db, sha256 b4d5c259751d235b998154c820d409f1805feba41759196560de82ccc81976ab)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6935cdfc16db,
  title = {Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement — arXiv:2611.08366},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6935cdfc16db; sha256 b4d5c259751d235b998154c820d409f1805feba41759196560de82ccc81976ab},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Ordinal information is central to tasks ranging from conference peer review to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback for large language models. In many such settings, there is no objective ground truth against which reports can be directly verified, making incentive-compatible elicitation challenging. Peer-prediction mechanisms have been designed to achieve truthful elicitation despite the lack of ground-truth verification. However, existing peer-prediction methods do not provide incentives for agents to truthfully compress rich private information (e.g. reviews) into coarser ordinal reports (e.g. rankings) requested by the mechanisms. We propose a simple ordinal peer-prediction mechanism that rewards agents based on pairwise agreement, measured by Kendall tau. Under a broad class of Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent models---which includes classical models such as Mallows and Thurstone---we prove that truthful reporting is stochastically dominant, and strongly truthful under index-equivariant strategies. This provides robust incentives even for agents with non-linear utility functions, such as risk aversion. Our mechanism further accommodates heterogeneous agents, top-K reports, and subset assignments, where each agent is scored against one randomly drawn peer. Experiments on synthetic Mallows and Thurstone data, together with a real-data stress test on the SUSHI preference dataset, show right-shifted truthful-payment distributions and the highest normalized sensitivity among tested baselines.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-06T14:20:12.603Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).