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An Incentive-Aligned Trust-Centric Coordination Layer for Heterogeneous Blockchain Interoperability — arXiv:2610.41032

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41032
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T07:36:27.694Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
23232de65e090e3913a5a09c7fa5cefa04b38c85d0128ebbaa28b00e5e686cc0
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_690d91bcd0a4

How to cite

An Incentive-Aligned Trust-Centric Coordination Layer for Heterogeneous Blockchain Interoperability — arXiv:2610.41032 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41032 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_690d91bcd0a4 (Metraipolis archive dc_690d91bcd0a4, sha256 23232de65e090e3913a5a09c7fa5cefa04b38c85d0128ebbaa28b00e5e686cc0)
BibTeX
@misc{dc690d91bcd0a4,
  title = {An Incentive-Aligned Trust-Centric Coordination Layer for Heterogeneous Blockchain Interoperability — arXiv:2610.41032},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41032},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_690d91bcd0a4; sha256 23232de65e090e3913a5a09c7fa5cefa04b38c85d0128ebbaa28b00e5e686cc0},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41032. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The interoperability between permissioned and public blockchains is hampered by asymmetric privacy, trust, and governance assumptions. We propose a coordination architecture that decouples cross-domain trust management and privacy enforcement from underlying blockchain protocols, requiring no protocol-level modifications. The framework integrates cryptographic unlinkability mechanisms with incentive-compatible relay selection, combining stake-weighted participation and temporally accumulated reputation to align economic commitment with sustained correctness. We formalize the adversarial model and derive security and privacy properties for cross-domain coordination, demonstrating robustness against Sybil infiltration, collusion, and strategic stake concentration. Simulation-based analysis characterizes key design trade-offs between quorum thresholds, reputation memory, and anonymity parameters, indicating that privacy-preserving coordination can be achieved without degrading responsiveness or incentive stability when parameters are properly tuned.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.DC, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41032 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T07:30:02.645Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.DC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).