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Benchmarking Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation in S3-Compatible Object Storage under Client Concurrency — arXiv:2610.21457
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21457
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T10:04:45.506Z
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How to cite
Benchmarking Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation in S3-Compatible Object Storage under Client Concurrency — arXiv:2610.21457 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21457 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_688a22db975d (Metraipolis archive dc_688a22db975d, sha256 9c68d5ee8f0062a201e1d0974ed522bc166daeead94b4a22a569b30e493af7c3)
BibTeX
@misc{dc688a22db975d,
title = {Benchmarking Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation in S3-Compatible Object Storage under Client Concurrency — arXiv:2610.21457},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21457},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_688a22db975d; sha256 9c68d5ee8f0062a201e1d0974ed522bc166daeead94b4a22a569b30e493af7c3},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21457. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Data encrypted today with classical public-key algorithms could be decrypted once large quantum computers exist. Cloud object stores keep data for years, so the client-side encryption that protects it must move to post-quantum algorithms such as ML-KEM, which adds a key-encapsulation step and a larger ciphertext to every stored object. So far, the cost of ML-KEM has been measured for the algorithm on its own and for securing network connections, but not for encrypting each object in a storage system that serves many clients at once. It has therefore been unclear whether ML-KEM slows such a system, under which conditions, and why. We address this problem by measuring per-object ML-KEM against classical key exchange on an S3-compatible object store, with two client implementations, two processor types and up to 500 concurrent workers, using pre-registered experiments and statistical equivalence tests. ML-KEM reduced throughput only when the client's processor was at or near full load, with one unexplained exception, and then by 4.0 to 4.9% in our main client. Controlled experiments on one processor type traced most of that loss to the way the software library was called, and a second, native client showed that the size of the loss depends on the implementation. The lasting cost is storage: 1,056 more bytes per object than with classical key exchange. The results cover two clients, one single-node store and one cloud provider. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.DC, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21457 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T08:45:02.693Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.DC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).