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Designing AI-Mediated Communication in Teams — arXiv:2611.04686
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04686
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-04T21:46:21.539Z
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Designing AI-Mediated Communication in Teams — arXiv:2611.04686 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04686 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_66d9f8bb7aec (Metraipolis archive dc_66d9f8bb7aec, sha256 0271b9eb05d5b1e9644e689d29bdcdefb90d002e49fb8c7445fd3b7cecffa72f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc66d9f8bb7aec,
title = {Designing AI-Mediated Communication in Teams — arXiv:2611.04686},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04686},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_66d9f8bb7aec; sha256 0271b9eb05d5b1e9644e689d29bdcdefb90d002e49fb8c7445fd3b7cecffa72f},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04686. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
AI assistants increasingly participate in work that requires employees to exchange information and coordinate decisions. We study how a firm should design this communication when workers' interests conflict with each other's and the firm's. Two workers privately know local conditions and their preferred responses, while the assistant knows aggregate project conditions. The firm discloses project information before workers report and choose their own actions. Transparency improves adaptation but can undermine truthful preference reporting. When workers agree with the firm on the productive direction, coarsening project information under weak coordination can preserve useful preference reporting at a cost in forecast precision. Under strong coordination, the firm instead prefers full project disclosure and factual reports, because preference information induces costly accommodation of private objectives. Under weak coordination, a firm-optimal policy can leave workers worse off than direct exchange; requiring their acceptance can call for further coarsening. Releasing project context after reports can sustain factual communication that early release would prevent. With separate delivery decisions that cannot be revised jointly, endogenous forwarding weakly improves firm-preferred performance over unchanged forwarding and strictly improves it in some environments. Numerical comparisons show that full initial disclosure captures most gains in the aligned environments considered, while further design has greater value when workers can favor opposing directions. The results distinguish the credibility of employees' reports from their organizational value and show how disclosure timing affects both. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04686 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-04T21:37:19.370Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).