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Asymptotic Max-Min Fair Allocation with Random Utilities — arXiv:2609.19319

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19319
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-10T03:54:32.703Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: fe05fc723ead72f5d506d7fc46cbb0f70f842c1294ff4a418c6d573ae4efedb1
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_666bc1f358ff

How to cite

Asymptotic Max-Min Fair Allocation with Random Utilities — arXiv:2609.19319 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19319 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_666bc1f358ff (Metraipolis archive dc_666bc1f358ff, sha256 fe05fc723ead72f5d506d7fc46cbb0f70f842c1294ff4a418c6d573ae4efedb1)

BibTeX

@misc{dc666bc1f358ff,
  title = {Asymptotic Max-Min Fair Allocation with Random Utilities — arXiv:2609.19319},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19319},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_666bc1f358ff; sha256 fe05fc723ead72f5d506d7fc46cbb0f70f842c1294ff4a418c6d573ae4efedb1},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19319. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We investigate the asymptotic behavior of max-min fair allocations for indivisible goods under i.i.d. random utilities. For $N$ agents and $K$ goods with utilities ${\mU_{i,j}}$ drawn independently from a common distribution $F$, we derive asymptotic characterizations of the max-min value in the balanced case $K=N$ (and in $K=LN$ extensions) via distributional quantiles. We then study the efficiency impact of max-min fairness by comparing the resulting total welfare with the optimal sum welfare. For distributions with sufficiently light tails, we prove that the relative efficiency loss converges to zero as the market grows, implying that max-min fairness incurs negligible welfare loss in large random instances for a broad class of distributions.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Information Theory (cs.IT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19319 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T03:25:20.228Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).