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FedGuard-DC: Privacy-Preserving Federated Load Forecasting and Cyber-Attack Detection for Data-Center Loads in Transmission Systems — arXiv:2608.19155

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.19155
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T13:51:54.931Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4db050def0971b47f0676dba4c81f9e1067424e3f2a2000905323a8d48a8e0c0
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_665a150214cd

How to cite

FedGuard-DC: Privacy-Preserving Federated Load Forecasting and Cyber-Attack Detection for Data-Center Loads in Transmission Systems — arXiv:2608.19155 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.19155 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_665a150214cd (Metraipolis archive dc_665a150214cd, sha256 4db050def0971b47f0676dba4c81f9e1067424e3f2a2000905323a8d48a8e0c0)
BibTeX
@misc{dc665a150214cd,
  title = {FedGuard-DC: Privacy-Preserving Federated Load Forecasting and Cyber-Attack Detection for Data-Center Loads in Transmission Systems — arXiv:2608.19155},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.19155},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_665a150214cd; sha256 4db050def0971b47f0676dba4c81f9e1067424e3f2a2000905323a8d48a8e0c0},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.19155. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The rapid growth of large data-center (DC) loads is creating new challenges for power-system visibility, privacy, and cyber-physical security. System operators need accurate short-term information about these fast-varying loads, while DC operators may avoid sharing raw megawatt measurements because they can reveal sensitive workload and utilization patterns. This paper presents FedGuard-DC, a federated learning (FL) framework for privacy-preserving DC load forecasting and local false-data-injection attack (FDIA) detection. Each DC trains a dual-head model on its own measurements, where a shared encoder supports both a forecasting head and a reconstruction head. A calibrated anomaly score combines forecast residual and reconstruction error to detect corrupted measurements locally. Raw measurements and absolute MW demand remain at each DC, while only model updates, normalized forecast outputs, and scalar attack flags are shared with the global controller. Optional differential privacy and robust trimmed-mean aggregation are included to evaluate privacy-utility behavior and poisoned-client resilience. The framework is validated using phasor-domain simulation data from four large DC loads rated between 150 and 350 MW integrated into the IEEE 39-bus New England system. Results show a 0.5 s-ahead normalized forecast RMSE of 0.023-0.038 pu, compared with 0.32-0.34 pu for persistence. FedGuard-DC detects FDIA with ROC-AUC of 0.979, F1 = 0.930, and precision of 0.988, while robust aggregation reduces the poisoned-client RMSE impact from 0.042 to 0.035 pu.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-20 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.19155 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T13:49:54.241Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-20?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).