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Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling — arXiv:2609.28873

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T04:52:09.468Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2d25361686c3b08fe35d07e3c94e70f3c55525a3261155845081674380a4c806
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6545304e98bd

How to cite

Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling — arXiv:2609.28873 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6545304e98bd (Metraipolis archive dc_6545304e98bd, sha256 2d25361686c3b08fe35d07e3c94e70f3c55525a3261155845081674380a4c806)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6545304e98bd,
  title = {Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling — arXiv:2609.28873},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6545304e98bd; sha256 2d25361686c3b08fe35d07e3c94e70f3c55525a3261155845081674380a4c806},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values. Although revenue-optimal mechanisms can require lotteries and infinite menus, Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg showed that the better of these two simple formats always achieves a constant fraction of optimal revenue. We prove that $\mathrm{OPT} \le 3.52 \max\{\mathrm{SREV}, \mathrm{BREV}\}$, where $\mathrm{SREV}$ and $\mathrm{BREV}$ are the optimal revenues from selling separately and grand bundling, respectively. This improves the previous best-known approximation factor of $5.2$ due to Ma and Simchi-Levi and narrows the gap to the known lower bound of $2$.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T04:29:42.570Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).