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A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc — arXiv:2611.04461

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-04T12:38:48.667Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
85dffcc1d62ea22a164a036262bbaf96283b323e91d94ad2c88e53402c2fa378
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6337e3ffa495

How to cite

A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc — arXiv:2611.04461 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6337e3ffa495 (Metraipolis archive dc_6337e3ffa495, sha256 85dffcc1d62ea22a164a036262bbaf96283b323e91d94ad2c88e53402c2fa378)
BibTeX
@misc{dc6337e3ffa495,
  title = {A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc — arXiv:2611.04461},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_6337e3ffa495; sha256 85dffcc1d62ea22a164a036262bbaf96283b323e91d94ad2c88e53402c2fa378},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We evaluate, at implementation level and under an explicit threat model, the verification pipelines of three Verifiable Credential (VC) formats: SD-JWT VC; the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 with the Data Integrity cryptosuite eddsa-rdfc-2022 (W3C VCDM); and mdoc (ISO/IEC 18013-5). For W3C VCDM we identify and exercise three structural attack surfaces from remote context resolution and RDFC-1.0 canonicalization: denial of service (DoS) via poison graphs, context injection through @context, and server-side request forgery (SSRF) reachable via malicious URLs, all at default settings. A poison graph, whose blank-node references are symmetric enough to force RDFC-1.0 into deep recursion, raises it to 278x the baseline from five blank nodes in 527 bytes, and to 13.5 s from eight. Every experiment ran in four environments sharing runtime and library versions; the multiple moves with the machine (251--424x for one input), not with its speed. Cost tracks that symmetry rather than the node count: an acyclic input with 1,500 blank nodes stays at 462--714x. A call limit separates the two: every attack family aborts at 16 or below, every legitimate credential completes at 1, but a shallow, wide recursion, such as the acyclic control, passes whatever the bound. DoS does not presuppose adversarial input: with production education schemas, canonicalization costs 23--34x a simple credential in one environment, 16--49x across four. Effective mitigations are a static document loader, which removes the retrieval latency and both remote-context surfaces; a context allowlist; and a call limit with a size bound. SD-JWT VC and mdoc need neither canonicalization nor external references, and our verifiers resisted every vector evaluated. These are not format-specific defects but properties of the pipeline and its configuration.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Software Engineering (cs.SE).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-04T12:29:17.143Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).