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Market Incentives for AI Safety Investment — arXiv:2610.21607

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21607
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T10:12:19.576Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4c8a124b2186d99acd6c9594f9f2dce4f47dc647a389da1eaf72efcc2193e1e4
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_62df5b7c2137

How to cite

Market Incentives for AI Safety Investment — arXiv:2610.21607 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21607 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_62df5b7c2137 (Metraipolis archive dc_62df5b7c2137, sha256 4c8a124b2186d99acd6c9594f9f2dce4f47dc647a389da1eaf72efcc2193e1e4)
BibTeX
@misc{dc62df5b7c2137,
  title = {Market Incentives for AI Safety Investment — arXiv:2610.21607},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21607},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_62df5b7c2137; sha256 4c8a124b2186d99acd6c9594f9f2dce4f47dc647a389da1eaf72efcc2193e1e4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21607. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Despite their practical significance, modern AI systems pose significant societal risks, including toxicity, malicious use, and misinformation. Their mitigation depends not only on technical feasibility but also on the incentives of firms that develop and deploy these systems. We show how profit maximization shapes safety investment in an AI supply chain with an upstream LLM provider and several competing downstream firms. In our game-theoretic model, we derive the market-driven level of safety investment and compare it with the levels that maximize market welfare and industry profit. We find that downstream competition generally induces downstream firms to invest more in safety than the industry-profit-optimal level. By contrast, the upstream provider may underinvest relative to these benchmarks because it is not fully compensated for the surplus from safety investments. Finally, we analyze how different regulatory interventions affect the participants' incentives and profits, and the resulting levels of model safety.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Machine Learning (cs.LG) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (stat.ML).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21607 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T08:46:02.648Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).