Metraipolis › archive › dc_625cebb8bccb

Microswimmers lose by swimming selfishly — arXiv:2610.41965

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41965
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T08:30:56.095Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b597c3545dc1d638012cb38334008092cb281342cfad2c3da33ff4dda200c957
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_625cebb8bccb

How to cite

Microswimmers lose by swimming selfishly — arXiv:2610.41965 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41965 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_625cebb8bccb (Metraipolis archive dc_625cebb8bccb, sha256 b597c3545dc1d638012cb38334008092cb281342cfad2c3da33ff4dda200c957)
BibTeX
@misc{dc625cebb8bccb,
  title = {Microswimmers lose by swimming selfishly — arXiv:2610.41965},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41965},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_625cebb8bccb; sha256 b597c3545dc1d638012cb38334008092cb281342cfad2c3da33ff4dda200c957},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41965. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

At low Reynolds number, microswimmers are coupled by the flows they create, even when they are apart. The best way for each swimmer to push itself forward then depends on its neighbors, turning swimming together into a game. To study this, we optimize the shape changes of soft swimmers, alone and in pairs, with a differentiable Stokes solver. From random initial membrane motions, a lone swimmer converges to a traveling membrane wave. In a pair, the stroke of a swimmer affects its neighbor far more than the neighbor affects its own best stroke. For swimmers in line, this influence decays as $1/\ell$ with their separation $\ell$, whereas the incentive to respond decays as $1/\ell^2$. Selfish swimmers, which maximize their own payoff, respond only to the weak incentive. The cooperative gain they miss decays only as $1/\ell^2$, and their selfish adaptations leave the pair worse off than if both had kept their solitary strokes. Related swimmers, which also value the payoff of their neighbor, recover this gain, whereas competitors pay to hinder each other, both following a law that we derive analytically. Hydrodynamics alone thus makes swimming in company a social dilemma, whose outcome depends on how much the swimmers value each other.

Tema degli esploratori: scienze della vita e salute (elenco arXiv q-bio.PE, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Soft Condensed Matter (cond-mat.soft) ; Biological Physics (physics.bio-ph); Fluid Dynamics (physics.flu-dyn); Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41965 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T08:13:38.932Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/q-bio.PE/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).