Metraipolis › archive › dc_61e29c2d6448
Cooldown Landmines: Cross-Tenant Interference Attacks on LLM Gateways — arXiv:2610.05089
- Source
- arXiv
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05089
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T05:29:51.550Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
66783855480902d48b19afdca697d20c0833be610a7a6457e9e50f03bcea91be- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_61e29c2d6448
How to cite
Cooldown Landmines: Cross-Tenant Interference Attacks on LLM Gateways — arXiv:2610.05089 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05089 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_61e29c2d6448 (Metraipolis archive dc_61e29c2d6448, sha256 66783855480902d48b19afdca697d20c0833be610a7a6457e9e50f03bcea91be)
BibTeX
@misc{dc61e29c2d6448,
title = {Cooldown Landmines: Cross-Tenant Interference Attacks on LLM Gateways — arXiv:2610.05089},
howpublished = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05089},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_61e29c2d6448; sha256 66783855480902d48b19afdca697d20c0833be610a7a6457e9e50f03bcea91be},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05089. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
LLM gateways enforce separate tenant quotas while sharing model deployments and cooldown records that temporarily exclude failing backends. However, a tenant's request failure can update these shared records and restrict other tenants' access to serviceable deployments. We identify two attacks that exploit this gap in LiteLLM. The first uses requests rejected at the key's requests-per-minute (RPM) limit: caller-supplied identifiers for known registered deployments reach failure handling, allowing two rejected requests to redirect another tenant to fallback with zero upstream calls from those requests. The second uses admitted traffic to create cooldown records that persist after backend capacity recovers. To address these failures, we design an origin check that blocks deployment updates from key RPM rejections and tenant-scoped cooldown that preserves the triggering tenant's back-off while retaining shared records for backend faults. Experiments with authenticated proxies and self-hosted vLLM demonstrate that the attacks can force fallback or denial while deployments remain serviceable. Across five paired four-worker runs, tenant scoping reduces victim fallback after recovery from 54/60 to 0/60, while increasing attempts against exhausted shared quotas. These findings show that tenant isolation must cover both request admission and the failure handling that governs shared deployment availability. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05089 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-06T05:26:35.353Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).