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Toward Responsible AI-Augmented Cyber Defense: Pattern Recognition, Defense-in-Depth, and the Case for Human-AI Collaboration — arXiv:2609.25921
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25921
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T13:46:45.339Z
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Toward Responsible AI-Augmented Cyber Defense: Pattern Recognition, Defense-in-Depth, and the Case for Human-AI Collaboration — arXiv:2609.25921 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25921 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_61dfb4b87f39 (Metraipolis archive dc_61dfb4b87f39, sha256 ea16fef8bc92fceb5ad3ddc87e4b74d62e6d3e05446d65abb4990fd1cbd80f2e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc61dfb4b87f39,
title = {Toward Responsible AI-Augmented Cyber Defense: Pattern Recognition, Defense-in-Depth, and the Case for Human-AI Collaboration — arXiv:2609.25921},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25921},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_61dfb4b87f39; sha256 ea16fef8bc92fceb5ad3ddc87e4b74d62e6d3e05446d65abb4990fd1cbd80f2e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25921. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Cybersecurity literature has extensively documented the operational benefits of artificial intelligence (AI) for threat detection, incident response, and prevention, while raising qualitative concerns about over-automation, algorithmic bias, and analyst-skill erosion. What remains largely absent is a formal, falsifiable model connecting three constructs that recur across this literature: Defense-in-Depth Theory, the Artificial Intelligence Theory of Pattern Recognition, and human-AI collaboration in security operations. This paper develops such a model. We formalize layered defense as a Bernoulli detection cascade in which AI augmentation enters multiplicatively across layers; we formalize each layer's pattern-recognition behavior as a Neyman-Pearson/Bayesian detector with a derived closed-form optimal threshold; and we formalize human-AI triage as a capacity-constrained cascade with an explicit, quantifiable trade-off between detection probability and false-alarm ("alert fatigue") rate. A Monte Carlo/analytical simulation evaluated at illustrative but realistic operating points shows that (i) AI augmentation compounds across defense layers, delivering its largest marginal gains exactly where traditional layering saturates, and (ii) full human review of AI-flagged alerts is not optimal: increasing analyst capacity toward 100% coverage cuts false alarms by roughly 20-fold but simultaneously lowers system-level detection probability, because imperfect analyst accuracy is then applied to every alert rather than a filtered subset. These results give the widely repeated qualitative recommendation of "balanced human-AI collaboration" a precise, testable form and suggest an interior-optimum capacity ratio as a concrete design target for security operations centers (SOCs), including those securing IT/OT-converged critical infrastructure.
Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25921 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:18:38.269Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).