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Warrant Theory — arXiv:2609.11667
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11667
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T05:27:08.298Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Warrant Theory — arXiv:2609.11667 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11667 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60a2eede7e4b (Metraipolis archive dc_60a2eede7e4b, sha256 fe6ffca7118759353747b7be6e47ad8706ff2393aba1c4b526057087393ebd97)
BibTeX
@misc{dc60a2eede7e4b,
title = {Warrant Theory — arXiv:2609.11667},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11667},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60a2eede7e4b; sha256 fe6ffca7118759353747b7be6e47ad8706ff2393aba1c4b526057087393ebd97},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11667. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In this paper, we develop warrant theory as a philosophical discipline concerned with the inferential legitimacy of propositions within logical analysis. Warrant theory reconceptualises logic as a normative framework governing the conditions under which propositions may be introduced, accepted, rejected, and inferentially employed. Warrant is understood as inferential entitlement and is distinguished from truth, belief, and other psychological attitudes, while its relation to inferential use and meaning is examined. Warrant-theoretic analysis is then developed as a systematic method for investigating how propositions acquire inferential standing, how that standing develops, and how inferential positions interact through relations of dependence, compatibility, incompatibility, and exclusion. Acceptance and rejection provide the bilateral vocabulary for representing positive and negative inferential positions and the consequences and commitments associated with them. Finally, these elements are brought together in a warrant-theoretic definition of logic as the formal and normative study of the conditions under which propositions may be legitimately accepted or rejected and of the inferential transitions that such legitimacy warrants. On this account, logical consequence and logical failure are understood through the presence, preservation, or absence of inferential entitlement, thus locating the philosophical subject matter of logic in the systematic governance of inferential legitimacy. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11667 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T05:17:52.183Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).