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Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver? — arXiv:2610.04468

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T05:29:30.371Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
1d15fafad055258806c74a79fdf1f6e36e1728f04b4bb795f61f0796a1b6a2af
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How to cite

Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver? — arXiv:2610.04468 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60927ec9fb24 (Metraipolis archive dc_60927ec9fb24, sha256 1d15fafad055258806c74a79fdf1f6e36e1728f04b4bb795f61f0796a1b6a2af)
BibTeX
@misc{dc60927ec9fb24,
  title = {Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver? — arXiv:2610.04468},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60927ec9fb24; sha256 1d15fafad055258806c74a79fdf1f6e36e1728f04b4bb795f61f0796a1b6a2af},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition between two such senders with opposing preferences, who report on a binary continuous-time Markov chain using state-dependent Poisson rates under individual budgets. The receiver follows the reports through a zero-order-hold estimator only if this yields at least the long-run weighted correct-estimation utility of a prior-based default estimate. We model the interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the sender favored by this default leads, the opposing sender follows, and the receiver then selects its estimator. We characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in closed form. When the follower can obtain positive utility against a silent leader, limited state-$0$ reporting by the leader merely frees part of the follower's budget for state-$1$ reports, so every optimal leader policy is either silence or full-budget state-$0$ reporting, depending on explicit budget thresholds. A single sender with the same total budget leaves the receiver at its default utility, whereas the full-budget intervention outcome makes the receiver's participation constraint slack and strictly improves its utility. At the intervention threshold, silence and full-budget intervention yield identical sender payoffs but different receiver utilities. Numerical results illustrate these regimes and compare equilibrium performance with a receiver-optimal reporting benchmark.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Information Theory (cs.IT) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI); Signal Processing (eess.SP); Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:25:35.329Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).