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Lacan: Making Accountability in Anonymous Networks Real — arXiv:2609.01075

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01075
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T06:46:49.696Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0c0413c4d8d73f32d03ceea8047990b13c3fe76ac0fdac6b0e52bdd5a1cd8f20
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60002402395d

How to cite

Lacan: Making Accountability in Anonymous Networks Real — arXiv:2609.01075 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01075 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60002402395d (Metraipolis archive dc_60002402395d, sha256 0c0413c4d8d73f32d03ceea8047990b13c3fe76ac0fdac6b0e52bdd5a1cd8f20)
BibTeX
@misc{dc60002402395d,
  title = {Lacan: Making Accountability in Anonymous Networks Real — arXiv:2609.01075},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01075},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_60002402395d; sha256 0c0413c4d8d73f32d03ceea8047990b13c3fe76ac0fdac6b0e52bdd5a1cd8f20},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01075. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Anonymity and accountability are essential properties for our everyday activity on the Internet. However, they appear contradictory, and their reconciliation remains far from reality. Existing approaches fall short in this regard, as they either rely on an on-path trustee, per-packet authorization, per-packet public-key cryptography, or per-session intervention by a central authority. We propose Lacan, a protocol that reconciles anonymity and accountability within a realistic design. In Lacan, a sender enjoys anonymity provided by on-path relays, as long as she complies with a contract established with the receiver. Upon a contract violation, the verifier, an off-path trustee on behalf of the receiver, links the malicious message to the sender's identity indirectly via the packet, path, and session, thereby reducing public-key operations from per-packet to per-session. This linkage remains robust even against malicious relays and receivers, grounded in our novel chain of successor proofs for accountable path reconstruction, together with traceable signatures, path validation, and key-committing encryption. We analyze the anonymity and accountability, implement the protocol, and evaluate the performance.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-02 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01075 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T06:38:14.384Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).