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Social-HUMINT: An LLM-Augmented Unified Framework for Measuring Social Media Exposure — arXiv:2610.31573

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31573
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-23T15:16:46.183Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
8e688907454800a5ef68f24d03f049a2602228976e52c187c56736d6f68bb38d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5ff8371f5ec2

How to cite

Social-HUMINT: An LLM-Augmented Unified Framework for Measuring Social Media Exposure — arXiv:2610.31573 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31573 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5ff8371f5ec2 (Metraipolis archive dc_5ff8371f5ec2, sha256 8e688907454800a5ef68f24d03f049a2602228976e52c187c56736d6f68bb38d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5ff8371f5ec2,
  title = {Social-HUMINT: An LLM-Augmented Unified Framework for Measuring Social Media Exposure — arXiv:2610.31573},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31573},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5ff8371f5ec2; sha256 8e688907454800a5ef68f24d03f049a2602228976e52c187c56736d6f68bb38d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31573. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In the post-API landscape, social-media profiling has become inexpensive and automated: Large Language Models (LLMs) can extract structured information from unstructured content and deduce attributes users never disclosed. A person's true exposure is not what they post but what can be inferred from it. As these practices become routine, exposure to social engineering attacks becomes an operational certainty, demanding a shared framework for assessment and mitigation. We make this exposure measurable by quantifying how accurately a target can be profiled, and how far that profile enables social engineering attacks. Because no existing model fully spans this continuum, we unify Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) and Cyber Human Intelligence (Cyber-HUMINT), two individual-focused disciplines that evolved separately, into a single doctrine-grounded taxonomy of 38 capabilities across the Cyber Threat Intelligence lifecycle, where user profiling bridges passive collection and active engagement. Domain experts validated the taxonomy (Fleiss' $\kappa$ = 0.92). We operationalize its core path (extraction, inference, and susceptibility assessment) as an LLM-augmented multi-agent pipeline, evaluated on real participants' public data. Susceptibility is assessed indirectly: the pipeline predicts how each target would rank personalized engagement options, matching their actual choices significantly above chance. This ranking capacity captures the personalization on which tailored attacks depend. The underlying profiles are accurate: extraction reaches F1 = 97.3%, and inferred attributes score 4.73/5, both far above rule-based and NER-based baselines at negligible cost. The framework augments security analysts' tradecraft rather than replacing it and enables defenders to gauge their own exposure before an adversary does.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31573 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-23T15:09:08.633Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).