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Deterministic Implementation of Mean-Preserving Contractions — arXiv:2610.41284

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41284
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-02T05:15:24.242Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 0b385f105877754162337da612c763140fd56fbeb556b979f17014a3563d8450
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5febbedab2bf

How to cite

Deterministic Implementation of Mean-Preserving Contractions — arXiv:2610.41284 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41284 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5febbedab2bf (Metraipolis archive dc_5febbedab2bf, sha256 0b385f105877754162337da612c763140fd56fbeb556b979f17014a3563d8450)

BibTeX

@misc{dc5febbedab2bf,
  title = {Deterministic Implementation of Mean-Preserving Contractions — arXiv:2610.41284},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41284},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5febbedab2bf; sha256 0b385f105877754162337da612c763140fd56fbeb556b979f17014a3563d8450},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41284. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study whether randomization is needed to generate a prescribed distribution of posterior means for a one-dimensional state. Drawing on backward Monge martingale transport, we show that every mean-preserving contraction of an atomless prior with finite first moment admits a deterministic implementation. Consequently, restricting attention to deterministic signals leaves the designer's value unchanged whenever objectives and constraints depend only on the posterior-mean distribution. We decompose implementation into independent problems on non-separating intervals and describe a constructive procedure based on barcode transport. We also characterize when lower or upper contour sets can take a nested-interval form, and provide applications to monopolistic pricing with buyer-optimal learning and robust persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41284 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T04:57:43.292Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).