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Who Pays for a Connected Public Good? — arXiv:2609.10565
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10565
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T05:45:10.717Z
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Who Pays for a Connected Public Good? — arXiv:2609.10565 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10565 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5ec6cef6076e (Metraipolis archive dc_5ec6cef6076e, sha256 040b3f95212ed49bb99a9174ca45bda96aa219933177ef1f3e5049c5cab09623)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5ec6cef6076e,
title = {Who Pays for a Connected Public Good? — arXiv:2609.10565},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10565},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5ec6cef6076e; sha256 040b3f95212ed49bb99a9174ca45bda96aa219933177ef1f3e5049c5cab09623},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10565. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Connectivity can turn separate contributions into a public good that benefits participants and nonparticipants alike. Yet only participants pay for it, and each can avoid her charge by withdrawing while enjoying whatever public output survives. How do network connections constrain who can or must pay, and how large a cost can the group bear? We study a participation game in which public output equals the size of the largest connected group of active players, whose members divide a fixed operating cost. The output a participant destroys by withdrawing is her withdrawal responsibility and bounds her payment. These bounds determine the group's cost-bearing capacity and, whenever the group can be kept active, which participants must pay. We prove that among connected networks with at least five players, the path uniquely maximizes the cost-bearing capacity of a group, yet minimizes the expected surviving output after a uniformly selected participant withdraws. As the group grows, the ratio of maximal capacity to gross social benefit under full participation converges to one quarter. Fragility can therefore strengthen voluntary finance, but even the most financeable network cannot close the gap between the value it creates and what its participants will pay to sustain it. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Combinatorics (math.CO). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10565 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:38.347Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).