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Type-Directed, Secure-by-Construction Enclave Partitioning for LLVM — arXiv:2609.02048
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02048
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T04:40:39.511Z
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Type-Directed, Secure-by-Construction Enclave Partitioning for LLVM — arXiv:2609.02048 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02048 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5e5d9ac47a4e (Metraipolis archive dc_5e5d9ac47a4e, sha256 fe0ebff57205b2d820e897c2abce1849aab0d32fd38340ca424b2330d3a3fdde)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5e5d9ac47a4e,
title = {Type-Directed, Secure-by-Construction Enclave Partitioning for LLVM — arXiv:2609.02048},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02048},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5e5d9ac47a4e; sha256 fe0ebff57205b2d820e897c2abce1849aab0d32fd38340ca424b2330d3a3fdde},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02048. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-supported isolation through enclaves that protect code and data independently of software abstractions. However, TEEs alone cannot enforce information-flow security. This problem is further aggravated in LLVM-like low-level languages that allow unrestricted pointer manipulation and unstructured control flow. Moreover, using TEEs effectively typically requires manually partitioning applications into enclave and non-enclave components, a process that is labor-intensive, error-prone, and lacks fine-grained control. We address these challenges with a three-step approach. First, we formalize SIR, an enclave-oblivious calculus based on LLVM IR, equipped with a novel permissive type system that enforces security against low-level attackers. To obtain meaningful guarantees, SIR combines information-flow control with security-aware coarse-grained memory safety. Second, we extend SIR to SIREN, an enclave-aware calculus that enforces noninterference against stronger attackers capable of observing arbitrary non-enclave memory. Third, we develop a type-driven, type-preserving compilation from SIR to SIREN that automatically produces secure enclave-aware programs, eliminating manual partitioning while providing fine-grained control over host-enclave boundaries. We implement and evaluate SPLITR on thirteen microbenchmarks and real-world workloads, including applications from SGXGauge, on Intel SGX hardware. SPLITR scales to OpenSSL (425,953 LLVM IR instructions) and supports multiple objectives that expose trade-offs among enclave TCB size, host-enclave transitions, and boundary data movement. For OpenSSL, optimizing for transitions reduces them from 393 to 187. Runtime overhead is dominated by fixed enclave costs for short-running workloads, whereas long-running applications better amortize these costs and approach native performance. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-03 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Programming Languages (cs.PL). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02048 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T04:09:09.346Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-03?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).