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"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agents — arXiv:2608.04755
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04755
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T11:27:31.741Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
bc6910ac5114592c8ef650f9aa27715ecde46daa8fed198a3244a486a9bbea2c- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5e55e9bddfef
How to cite
"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agents — arXiv:2608.04755 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04755 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5e55e9bddfef (Metraipolis archive dc_5e55e9bddfef, sha256 bc6910ac5114592c8ef650f9aa27715ecde46daa8fed198a3244a486a9bbea2c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5e55e9bddfef,
title = {"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agents — arXiv:2608.04755},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04755},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5e55e9bddfef; sha256 bc6910ac5114592c8ef650f9aa27715ecde46daa8fed198a3244a486a9bbea2c},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04755. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Mobile GUI agents routinely encounter system permission dialogs during task execution, yet their ability to grant only permissions that are necessary for the delegated task remains largely unexamined. We present a systematic study of this capability, which we term Permission Literacy. We construct a four-level permission framework based on task relevance and privacy risk and validate the evaluated scenarios with three independent experts in GUI-agent safety. We inject Android-style permission popups into real GUI tasks and evaluate four frontier multimodal large language models using synchronized annotated screenshots and UI-tree hierarchies, making the requester, permission, justification, and available actions accessible to the agent. Beyond the main study, we conduct controlled interventions that separately vary task context and agent-visible requester identity. Under the same Calendar task, changing only the requester from Calendar to PiMusic reduces grants from 26/32 to 0/32, revealing a strong but task-conditioned App-Trust Bias. Holding a popup fixed while changing task context also substantially changes authorization decisions, revealing a systematic Task-Prior Override. Prompt interventions can reduce unnecessary grants, but their effectiveness is inconsistent across models and may come at the cost of suppressing legitimate grants. These results suggest that separating task execution from permission authorization is a promising design direction for future work. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-06 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04755 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-31T11:17:19.448Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-06?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).