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The hidden life of signals: Time-domain inferences and other privacy attacks on everyday devices — arXiv:2609.27803

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T10:13:19.559Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c40917fb73e40c4dbc08fbd5ca9d670925215ac048920839507dd67c6f308407
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5dbcd0595133

How to cite

The hidden life of signals: Time-domain inferences and other privacy attacks on everyday devices — arXiv:2609.27803 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5dbcd0595133 (Metraipolis archive dc_5dbcd0595133, sha256 c40917fb73e40c4dbc08fbd5ca9d670925215ac048920839507dd67c6f308407)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5dbcd0595133,
  title = {The hidden life of signals: Time-domain inferences and other privacy attacks on everyday devices — arXiv:2609.27803},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5dbcd0595133; sha256 c40917fb73e40c4dbc08fbd5ca9d670925215ac048920839507dd67c6f308407},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In privacy research on radiofrequency-based protocols, the dominant focus has remained on Bluetooth, WiFi, and Zigbee, while a broader and arguably more consequential attack surface has gone largely unnoticed: the privacy risks created by the composition of everyday wireless protocols. Widely deployed systems such as KeeLoq remotes, vehicle TPMS sensors, and other sub-GHz devices continuously emit metadata and timing structure that, when analyzed jointly rather than in isolation, enable powerful behavioral inference. This work-in-progress paper argues that privacy leakage in these environments is not merely a property of individual protocols, but an emergent property of their interaction, correlation, and composition across devices, spaces, and routines. The resulting attack surface arises both from protocol metadata that directly degrades privacy and from the latent relationships between devices and the ways users move among and interact with them over time. We present preliminary evidence that these composed signals expose underappreciated opportunities for inference and tracking, and we outline a research agenda for characterizing and mitigating this broader class of privacy failures.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T09:26:35.711Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).