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Persistent mixed worldviews in the theory of chosen preferences — arXiv:2609.19316
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19316
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T04:20:47.301Z
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Persistent mixed worldviews in the theory of chosen preferences — arXiv:2609.19316 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19316 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5bf4368e2379 (Metraipolis archive dc_5bf4368e2379, sha256 b286df92957bb8a584d8e9c67a14d9aefa25236ffac734cd4f096fd77151146e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5bf4368e2379,
title = {Persistent mixed worldviews in the theory of chosen preferences — arXiv:2609.19316},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19316},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5bf4368e2379; sha256 b286df92957bb8a584d8e9c67a14d9aefa25236ffac734cd4f096fd77151146e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19316. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Bernheim, Braghieri, Martínez-Marquina, and Zuckerman (2021, American Economic Review) develop a theory of chosen preferences and conjecture convergence to pure worldviews at low mindset flexibility. We show that the (original) conjecture fails: with arbitrarily many worldviews, a common-value action sustains mixed worldviews in every stationary equilibrium from a relatively open set of initial worldviews, even when all pure worldviews are absorbing. However, finite linear programs characterize a sufficient persistence condition. Conversely, mixed accumulation points require shared valuation maxima. If each implementable action has a unique maximizing evaluator, every existing stationary equilibrium converges to purity for all interior flexibility and discount parameters. Experienced utility converges without uniqueness. In existing equilibria, small payoff perturbations preserve compromise over fixed horizons with high probability. Strictly tailored worldviews yield existence and a one-step equilibrium characterization at sufficiently low mindset flexibility; weak implementation can preclude stationary pure-strategy existence. The persistence and convergence results extend to stationary randomization. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in math.OC). Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19316 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-10T04:09:28.155Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).