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FreeSBee: A Constant-Time Compilation Pipeline — arXiv:2610.20171
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20171
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T21:46:41.023Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
59c873a5dee978ba86371e0c53af3cbfb843bec9f7f2a5b57eba8f4ae85adefc- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5b17facba073
How to cite
FreeSBee: A Constant-Time Compilation Pipeline — arXiv:2610.20171 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20171 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5b17facba073 (Metraipolis archive dc_5b17facba073, sha256 59c873a5dee978ba86371e0c53af3cbfb843bec9f7f2a5b57eba8f4ae85adefc)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5b17facba073,
title = {FreeSBee: A Constant-Time Compilation Pipeline — arXiv:2610.20171},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20171},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5b17facba073; sha256 59c873a5dee978ba86371e0c53af3cbfb843bec9f7f2a5b57eba8f4ae85adefc},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20171. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Constant-time execution is an important security property, especially for IoT devices, that prevents the leakage of sensitive information over timing side-channels. However, achieving constant-time execution is very hard when going down to the cycle level, at least on realistic devices. A lot of research is concerned with producing tools that either determine whether code is constant-time or that ensure it is compiled into a constant-time binary, with various degrees of accuracy. In this work, we present and evaluate a full workflow for hardening against timing side-channels during compilation. It starts with taint analysis to determine the code locations that depend on sensitive information. These are then the object of automated control-flow transformations inside the compiler to seal possible timing side-channels. We evaluate our workflow in detail on a realistic application running on a RISC-V core using both static timing analysis and statistical methods. Even though we do not reach cycle-accurate constant-time execution, our statistical results suggest that our hardened binary is safe against timing attacks. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20171 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T21:33:44.517Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).