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Learning to bid and bundle: a posterior-sampling agent for online retail — arXiv:2611.00165

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00165
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T11:00:33.904Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f452ffea2aaa09561497121ed1393d2294dc6f1ffaf07de7c249e4203469c05e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5901aec2944b

How to cite

Learning to bid and bundle: a posterior-sampling agent for online retail — arXiv:2611.00165 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00165 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5901aec2944b (Metraipolis archive dc_5901aec2944b, sha256 f452ffea2aaa09561497121ed1393d2294dc6f1ffaf07de7c249e4203469c05e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5901aec2944b,
  title = {Learning to bid and bundle: a posterior-sampling agent for online retail — arXiv:2611.00165},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00165},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5901aec2944b; sha256 f452ffea2aaa09561497121ed1393d2294dc6f1ffaf07de7c249e4203469c05e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00165. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

An online retailer launching a perishable product bids for sponsored-search clicks, discounts a bundle with an always-stocked staple and displays its remaining stock, which raises willingness to pay. It knows neither how clicks respond to its bid nor how strong and dispersed its market is, and learns both over repeated seasons from data its own decisions censor: a zero bid reveals nothing about paid clicks, and choices follow only clicks. We design a posterior-sampling agent for it. Each period it draws a market from an exact posterior and posts the bid and discount of that market's exactly solved season plan, so every action is one a fully informed seller could take. In a simulated online florist it has the lowest regret averaged over markets. In weak markets it gives up 12% to 23% of one season's revenue over 500 seasons, four to seven times less than drawing once per season. A planner acting on point estimates can stop bidding and never learn that bidding pays. The agent escapes after about three seasons on average, against fifty with one draw per season. Where displayed scarcity keeps willingness to pay above the posted price, the discount needs no learning. Customers waiting for the discount to return to its recent level look like lost sales, so frequent waiting makes the agent underrate its market. One discount per season removes waiting at a cost of 5.9% of clairvoyant revenue in a weak market and none in a strong one.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00165 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T10:59:45.680Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).