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Sharp Second-Best Welfare in Bilateral and Matching Markets — arXiv:2609.37366
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37366
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T17:25:54.865Z
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Sharp Second-Best Welfare in Bilateral and Matching Markets — arXiv:2609.37366 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37366 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5880397d2cee (Metraipolis archive dc_5880397d2cee, sha256 8fdee3bec38ccf970115fac26dc4b44ce24ad27637506cf89fd7c3c71c2ec525)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5880397d2cee,
title = {Sharp Second-Best Welfare in Bilateral and Matching Markets — arXiv:2609.37366},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37366},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5880397d2cee; sha256 8fdee3bec38ccf970115fac26dc4b44ce24ad27637506cf89fd7c3c71c2ec525},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37366. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
How much social welfare must a market lose because values are private? We determine the sharp ratio of second-best to first-best welfare under independent nonnegative types, Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and no expected budget deficit. The ratio is approximately $0.8882516903$ for arbitrary priors and $0.9113893681$ when buyers have monotone hazard rates and sellers are unrestricted. The arbitrary-prior guarantee holds for every downward-closed family of feasible matchings; the MHR guarantee holds when every matching of a compatibility graph is feasible. Both constants are \revise{attained}{sharp} already in bilateral trade. The proof keeps the sellers' initial endowment inside the budget Lagrangian. For arbitrary priors, a common threshold decomposition reduces the problem to three-parameter power-law distributions. For monotone hazards, common transformations of buyer and seller scores reduce it to shifted capped exponential buyers; a typewise allocation certificate and an explicit worst-case seller satisfy the same boundary equation. The bilateral-to-matching framework, with a welfare endowment charge and an MHR-preserving packing argument, transfers these affine inequalities without loss. We give exact variational characterizations of both constants and reproducible interval certificates for their numerical evaluation. Unrestricted signed transfers also permit pointwise strong budget balance.
Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37366 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T16:57:11.438Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).