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How to Beat FCFS — arXiv:2608.11710

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11710
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T06:06:14.947Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
03399a95dd8d6913e86e8a12113188ce09bbc59e1234075a4cc6132f9b8e8c65
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_571d56ffd4dd

How to cite

How to Beat FCFS — arXiv:2608.11710 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11710 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_571d56ffd4dd (Metraipolis archive dc_571d56ffd4dd, sha256 03399a95dd8d6913e86e8a12113188ce09bbc59e1234075a4cc6132f9b8e8c65)
BibTeX
@misc{dc571d56ffd4dd,
  title = {How to Beat FCFS — arXiv:2608.11710},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11710},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_571d56ffd4dd; sha256 03399a95dd8d6913e86e8a12113188ce09bbc59e1234075a4cc6132f9b8e8c65},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11710. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. Assuming one queue uses the ubiquitous First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) service rule, we show that by simply modifying its service order, the other queue can capture a strict majority of the demand. We establish an upper bound on the arrival share any rule can capture against FCFS. When both queues can design their service order, we show a novel variant of Last-Come-First-Served (LCFS) is an equilibrium in a low congestion regime. Without commitment, the picture changes, and there is an equilibrium where both queues use FCFS, and agents route to the queue with the shorter waitlist.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-13 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11710 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T05:55:52.867Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-13?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).