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If Agents Were Angels, No Governance Would Be Necessary: Out-of-Band Policy Enforcement at a Trusted Tool Boundary — arXiv:2608.27646

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27646
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T10:47:08.491Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f630e02dd7978235ac4fc37d827777d94427adb700a1919a240a38ffd12b4d98
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_56f5aaa9efc3

How to cite

If Agents Were Angels, No Governance Would Be Necessary: Out-of-Band Policy Enforcement at a Trusted Tool Boundary — arXiv:2608.27646 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27646 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_56f5aaa9efc3 (Metraipolis archive dc_56f5aaa9efc3, sha256 f630e02dd7978235ac4fc37d827777d94427adb700a1919a240a38ffd12b4d98)
BibTeX
@misc{dc56f5aaa9efc3,
  title = {If Agents Were Angels, No Governance Would Be Necessary: Out-of-Band Policy Enforcement at a Trusted Tool Boundary — arXiv:2608.27646},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27646},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_56f5aaa9efc3; sha256 f630e02dd7978235ac4fc37d827777d94427adb700a1919a240a38ffd12b4d98},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27646. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Give an agent a human's credential and it inherits the person's reach without the judgment that limits its use. It can sweep every reachable record into model context, where hidden instructions steer its next call, and every request stays credential-valid while the agent exceeds its job or absorbs a secret. Prompts are a brittle guardrail: one fallible reasoner interprets the task and enforces its limits. We present Out-of-Band Policy Enforcement (OBPE), a trusted boundary outside agent reasoning. It authorizes the typed operation and resource, narrows the query before the backend call, then filters records and fields or masks values in the response. Semantic gating can deny or hold an authorized call on argument values or external state. A data policy owner sets the maximum grant; agent policy can only narrow it. We prove, under stated conditions, that the policy plan is order-independent and agent policy cannot widen the ceiling. Field removal covers one execution; masking and history rules claim less. We release an HTTP proxy prototype simplified from our production system, with conformance tests tying its typed Cedar policy core to the model. Against Jira and ServiceNow mocks, our benchmark compares prompted agents with and without OBPE on four models, including 20 adaptive red-team tasks. A trace failure means protected data entered agent context, an exact value appeared in the answer, or a forbidden effect completed. In 3,621 trials it fell from 57.6% to 0.2%, a cluster-weighted reduction of 41.2 points [95% CI: 27.7, 54.9]; fulfillment fell from 79.1% to 60.9%, while paired safe-useful completion rose 21.8 points [9.5, 35.2]. Some answers reconstructed a value that never entered context or used filtered row counts as an oracle: shaping one execution is not noninterference. Write controls, durable approval, and temporal and aggregate policies lie outside this evaluation.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-31 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27646 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T10:33:42.339Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-31?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).