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Selective Verification in Centralized Admissions: Which Priority Claims Must Be Checked? — arXiv:2610.10131
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10131
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T14:14:27.308Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
5cf6ff8aba7cce4cfcfbed466b795703a77c74eb6f82a72be1d927e45c5128c1- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Selective Verification in Centralized Admissions: Which Priority Claims Must Be Checked? — arXiv:2610.10131 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10131 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_56027bb7c2bf (Metraipolis archive dc_56027bb7c2bf, sha256 5cf6ff8aba7cce4cfcfbed466b795703a77c74eb6f82a72be1d927e45c5128c1)
BibTeX
@misc{dc56027bb7c2bf,
title = {Selective Verification in Centralized Admissions: Which Priority Claims Must Be Checked? — arXiv:2610.10131},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10131},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_56027bb7c2bf; sha256 5cf6ff8aba7cce4cfcfbed466b795703a77c74eb6f82a72be1d927e45c5128c1},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10131. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Centralized admissions platforms grant priority based on self-reported facts such as residence, sibling status, or family income, and a false claim can cost another applicant her seat. Verifying every claim before matching is expensive, yet checking only admitted applicants afterward is unsafe: a false claim by an applicant who ends up unmatched may already have triggered a chain of rejections. We show how a platform can check far fewer claims without changing any outcome. A claim matters only if it can move its applicant across a school's admission cutoff, and we give an exact, easily computed test for when this happens. Checking only such claims, and only when they could change a school's tentative choice, reproduces every application, rejection, and assignment of deferred acceptance under full verification. When claims are truthful, checking the highest claimed priority first minimizes checks among such policies at each school decision, and the number of checks never exceeds the school's capacity. Truthful reporting of preferences and eligibility is a weakly dominant strategy, so incentives deliver the conditions under which this audit order is optimal. In simulated markets, the policy cuts verification by 76 percent relative to checking every claim upfront and by 36 percent relative to checking each claim when it first reaches a school. The design principle is to verify decisions, not files. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10131 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T13:28:15.815Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).