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RuleAutoPilot: Synthesizing Deployable Suricata Rules from Network Traffic — arXiv:2609.16231

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16231
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T19:33:04.271Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
79247a257ae34e61f2ccff0335c0cf1ca10cc36f39fa02db1226bcaea8dd4265
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55d683ad00ce

How to cite

RuleAutoPilot: Synthesizing Deployable Suricata Rules from Network Traffic — arXiv:2609.16231 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16231 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55d683ad00ce (Metraipolis archive dc_55d683ad00ce, sha256 79247a257ae34e61f2ccff0335c0cf1ca10cc36f39fa02db1226bcaea8dd4265)
BibTeX
@misc{dc55d683ad00ce,
  title = {RuleAutoPilot: Synthesizing Deployable Suricata Rules from Network Traffic — arXiv:2609.16231},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16231},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55d683ad00ce; sha256 79247a257ae34e61f2ccff0335c0cf1ca10cc36f39fa02db1226bcaea8dd4265},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16231. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Rule-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) such as Suricata are central to network security, yet crafting effective detection rules demands deep expert knowledge and cannot keep pace with emerging threats. Existing LLM-based approaches can reduce analyst effort, but they either rely on curated threat intelligence that is produced only after the underlying traffic artifacts already exist, or they require costly LLM use without sufficient quality control. We present RuleAutoPilot, an end-to-end agentic framework that generates deployable Suricata rules directly from malware network traffic, with no prior threat intelligence required. A key challenge is noise: network traffic captures often contain a small amount of security-relevant traffic mixed with large volumes of background traffic, which reduces LLM reasoning quality and increases cost. RuleAutoPilot addresses this challenge with a Benign Traffic Fingerprinting stage that removes known benign background flows before LLM processing. Rules that fail syntax checks, do not trigger on the source traffic, or generate false positives on a benign corpus are automatically repaired using structured feedback. Across 1,296 malware PCAPs, execution-grounded verification raises rule quality (F1) from 0.443 to 0.539. On a stratified 200-PCAP subset, RuleAutoPilot on the open-weight gpt-oss-120b reaches near-frontier quality, 0.524 F1 against Claude Opus 5 under Claude Code's 0.623, at 52x lower billed-token cost. Swapping only the backbone to Claude Opus 5, RuleAutoPilot surpasses Claude Code outright, 0.656 F1 against 0.623, at 40x fewer tokens. A stronger backbone raises RuleAutoPilot's own ceiling, but at the same backbone, our scaffold still outperforms Claude Code's, showing the scaffold contributes independently of the backbone.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-16 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16231 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T18:42:42.596Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-16?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).