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A Case for Competition in Information Provision — arXiv:2608.24129
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24129
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T07:34:49.237Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
11e47f59158effdfaed98222ab3173d46664208375c41ef98c4822626264662c- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55995db7c68e
How to cite
A Case for Competition in Information Provision — arXiv:2608.24129 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24129 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55995db7c68e (Metraipolis archive dc_55995db7c68e, sha256 11e47f59158effdfaed98222ab3173d46664208375c41ef98c4822626264662c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc55995db7c68e,
title = {A Case for Competition in Information Provision — arXiv:2608.24129},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24129},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_55995db7c68e; sha256 11e47f59158effdfaed98222ab3173d46664208375c41ef98c4822626264662c},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24129. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study how competition among biased news sources affects information and welfare when sources can misrepresent facts at a cost. Monopolistic and competitive market structures admit many equilibria. We develop a common belief-based selection criterion that applies to both and makes welfare comparisons possible. Under the refined outcomes, adding an oppositely biased source improves the receiver's welfare when that source faces sufficiently high misreporting costs. Competition disciplines the incumbent while introducing a few distortions of its own. Better information need not increase total welfare, and distorted advice from a monopolist can raise total welfare. Competition may improve decision-making without being socially beneficial. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24129 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T07:30:50.338Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).