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Assortment and Procurement Design in Dual-Mode Content Platforms — arXiv:2609.03285
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03285
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T03:01:17.119Z
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Assortment and Procurement Design in Dual-Mode Content Platforms — arXiv:2609.03285 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03285 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_54da1ee07ffc (Metraipolis archive dc_54da1ee07ffc, sha256 a7ad103004392fc5778cad809fdf4bd78f591a26be48c034e4f0b5392a926366)
BibTeX
@misc{dc54da1ee07ffc,
title = {Assortment and Procurement Design in Dual-Mode Content Platforms — arXiv:2609.03285},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03285},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_54da1ee07ffc; sha256 a7ad103004392fc5778cad809fdf4bd78f591a26be48c034e4f0b5392a926366},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03285. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study assortment and procurement design for a digital content platform offering both ad-supported and subscription access. Users are heterogeneous in content preferences and ad tolerance and self-select between the two modes or an outside option. For a fixed common subscription price and ad load, the platform chooses assortment distributions specific to each user type and access mode, together with content-family-level buy-versus-rent decisions to maximize profit. Rental costs scale with realized consumption, whereas buying provides a reusable pool of titles whose cost depends on the largest induced requirement across user types and modes. We show that the resulting problem is NP-hard. We then develop a scalable approximation framework based on a candidate buy set, a relaxation of the procurement coupling, and a decomposition into linear programs with a single equality constraint. These subproblems are solved by dual bisection with cardinality-constrained assortment optimization, followed by restricted-master postprocessing to recover primal feasibility. The method yields computable optimality-gap bounds, an interpretable threshold-based procurement heuristic, and asymptotic optimality under proportional market scaling as market size and grid resolution increase. Numerical experiments show strong performance at moderate market scales and grid sizes. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.DS). Categorie arXiv: Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03285 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T02:39:14.118Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.DS/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).