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Recommendations with Costly Verification — arXiv:2611.01195
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01195
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T19:07:13.752Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
fc716565ba4c4f90192b1fae09d967ce72bc872a0b8639cc66fd636c1e375a04- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_54bb1f29cd7c
How to cite
Recommendations with Costly Verification — arXiv:2611.01195 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01195 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_54bb1f29cd7c (Metraipolis archive dc_54bb1f29cd7c, sha256 fc716565ba4c4f90192b1fae09d967ce72bc872a0b8639cc66fd636c1e375a04)
BibTeX
@misc{dc54bb1f29cd7c,
title = {Recommendations with Costly Verification — arXiv:2611.01195},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01195},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_54bb1f29cd7c; sha256 fc716565ba4c4f90192b1fae09d967ce72bc872a0b8639cc66fd636c1e375a04},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01195. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
A recommender faces consumers who can verify recommendations, but differ in their attention costs or in the salience of their choice of adoption. We characterize the conditions under which a technology that increases transparency by lowering the cost of verifying a product's quality will increase or decrease false recommendations. Without commitment, reducing verification costs never increases false recommendations, but when the recommender can commit to a policy, transparency can worsen both the quality of recommendations and consumer welfare. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the log-elasticity of the distribution of consumer cost types is decreasing. It can hold when the distribution is sufficiently fat-tailed, or when it mixes sophisticated and naive consumers. Our results can be applied to platform-recommended listings, security ratings, and audits. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01195 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T18:25:22.739Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).