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An Inline Control Architecture for Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems — arXiv:2608.04065

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T11:13:31.232Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
fb4bb438534b5f5f7ea237c53a5e18055d1e8746f0ccd24a4bf12b219d33242f
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5492ffc405cc

How to cite

An Inline Control Architecture for Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems — arXiv:2608.04065 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5492ffc405cc (Metraipolis archive dc_5492ffc405cc, sha256 fb4bb438534b5f5f7ea237c53a5e18055d1e8746f0ccd24a4bf12b219d33242f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5492ffc405cc,
  title = {An Inline Control Architecture for Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems — arXiv:2608.04065},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5492ffc405cc; sha256 fb4bb438534b5f5f7ea237c53a5e18055d1e8746f0ccd24a4bf12b219d33242f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems increasingly incorporate large language models (LLMs) for semantic tasks such as message summarization, operator assistance, and decision support at roadside units and edge nodes. Although these components are not part of safety-critical control loops, they introduce prompt-level attack surfaces that are not addressed by traditional V2X security mechanisms focused on authentication and message integrity. This paper presents Guarded-V2X, an inline semantic guardrail architecture for securing LLM-enabled V2X services under real-time constraints. The proposed system integrates rule-based ingress filtering, a lightweight safety classifier, policy-constrained structured generation, trusted-only retrieval, and post-decision adjudication to enforce machine-checkable safety boundaries prior to downstream execution. Guarded-V2X is evaluated using a four-stage experimental pipeline encompassing intrusion vulnerability analysis, calibration and latency benchmarking, guardrail validation, and robustness under adversarial stress. Experiments are conducted on a V2X-aligned simulated dataset derived from RSU advisories, operator messages, and annotated V2X message summaries. Results show that unguarded and prompt-only baselines retain residual vulnerability under multi-turn adversarial trials, while Guarded-V2X consistently reduces intrusion acceptance success rates and eliminates observed unsafe completions in two-turn settings, without exceeding latency budgets for V2X semantic advisory paths.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-06 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T11:02:13.475Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-06?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).