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Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts — arXiv:2609.25410
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25410
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T14:40:50.565Z
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Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts — arXiv:2609.25410 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25410 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5393cb3a05ca (Metraipolis archive dc_5393cb3a05ca, sha256 21631575917414e0be5e6f2ad02feed182a52d848160d828585c17ee65e17089)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5393cb3a05ca,
title = {Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts — arXiv:2609.25410},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25410},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5393cb3a05ca; sha256 21631575917414e0be5e6f2ad02feed182a52d848160d828585c17ee65e17089},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25410. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study strategic disclosure of the action space in principal-agent contracting, where an agent selects a disclosed action set to shape the principal's perception of her capabilities before contract design. Unaware of the strategic disclosure, the principal designs a revenue-optimal contract as if the disclosed action set were complete and accurate. We consider two variants distinguished by cost verifiability. When costs are unverifiable, the agent can extract the entire first-best surplus, leaving the principal with zero revenue. When costs are verifiable, we characterize the agent's optimal disclosure strategy in binary-outcome settings and, more generally, when the principal is restricted to linear contracts, reducing the agent's problem to a two-variable convex optimization problem. We prove that the agent can secure utility of at least a $1/e$ fraction of the first-best surplus, which also yields a $1/e$ welfare guarantee under optimal disclosure. While the principal's revenue can be arbitrarily small compared to the first-best surplus, when the ratio of maximum to minimum expected reward among non-null base actions is at most $L$, we establish a revenue guarantee of $\Theta(1/\log L)$ relative to the first-best surplus. We also compare utilities and welfare under strategic disclosure with their counterparts in the canonical model. Finally, we extend the agent's $1/e$ utility guarantee to general outcome spaces without restricting the principal to linear contracts. Our results show how strategic action-space disclosure changes the distribution of surplus while preserving a constant-factor welfare guarantee under the agent's optimal disclosure. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25410 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T13:54:10.266Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).