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Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2609.37373
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37373
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T20:46:12.499Z
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Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2609.37373 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37373 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5385a4e5178e (Metraipolis archive dc_5385a4e5178e, sha256 9f8ca47beba5ddf88bfb11446c6c69c7758f371c7adaaf63e6b88ad5b364f6e3)
BibTeX
@misc{dc5385a4e5178e,
title = {Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2609.37373},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37373},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_5385a4e5178e; sha256 9f8ca47beba5ddf88bfb11446c6c69c7758f371c7adaaf63e6b88ad5b364f6e3},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37373. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We create a set of 6 axioms relating to strategic voting and study them on single transferable vote (STV), Meek STV, Bloc, Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda. For Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda, we implement ``optimistic'' and ``pessimistic'' models for handing incomplete ballots, thus turning each of the three into two separate voting rules. We determine which voting rules satisfy each axiom. We find that under Chamberlin-Courant and k-Borda, the optimistic models encourage burying, while the pessimistic models encourage truncation strategies, indicating that the handling of partial ballots has tremendous implications for strategic voting. We define an axiom called no skipped payment that differentiates similar rules, as Meek STV and Chamberlin-Courant satisfy it, while STV and Monroe fail. Each voting rule was found to fail favorite betrayal, revealing that none of them are completely immune to strategic voting. In general, STV variants are relatively resistant to strategic voting while Monroe is susceptible to a wide range of strategies. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37373 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T20:06:55.288Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).