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Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games — arXiv:2609.19399

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19399
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T03:23:00.716Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2a2a5c147845d122f04be14d7fde51b969a0a69979c5d34c0a4dd216ff5b424b
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_537fdc5089ad

How to cite

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games — arXiv:2609.19399 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19399 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_537fdc5089ad (Metraipolis archive dc_537fdc5089ad, sha256 2a2a5c147845d122f04be14d7fde51b969a0a69979c5d34c0a4dd216ff5b424b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc537fdc5089ad,
  title = {Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games — arXiv:2609.19399},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19399},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_537fdc5089ad; sha256 2a2a5c147845d122f04be14d7fde51b969a0a69979c5d34c0a4dd216ff5b424b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19399. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Game-theoretic analyses of cyber defence often compute equilibria of games whose payoffs exist only as the output of a simulator. Iterative equilibrium-finding methods grow a set of attacker and defender policies and need the payoff of every attacker--defender pair, so they are bottlenecked by payoff estimation: each payoff costs many simulator runs. We introduce Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), which spends a fixed simulation budget on the payoffs the equilibrium actually depends on and predicts the rest with a model trained on every payoff measured so far. Standard error bounds for estimated games are driven by the worst-estimated payoff, so they cannot credit an estimator that is inaccurate only where accuracy does not matter. We prove a bound that weights payoff errors by the opponent's equilibrium strategy, a certificate that can be computed from simulated payoffs alone, and a condition under which errors in the predicted payoffs cannot change either player's regret. On three synthetic general-sum games, one of them a Colonel Blotto game of military resource allocation, the new bounds are four to six times tighter than the standard one, and RWPS finds less exploitable equilibria than minimum-regret-first search, information-gain search and progressive sampling at the same budget. On two cyber-defence simulators, CyGym and a new game whose hosts are LLM agents exposed to prompt injection, it gives the least exploitable equilibria at the smallest budgets.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19399 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T03:04:13.807Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).