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Faster Verification of PJR$^+$ via Mincuts — arXiv:2609.20579

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20579
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T03:54:35.738Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
355da601affba298898093c5d7143397c5be43f1c381aa9ed02c55a52789d940
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_522b2ce93cb6

How to cite

Faster Verification of PJR$^+$ via Mincuts — arXiv:2609.20579 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20579 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_522b2ce93cb6 (Metraipolis archive dc_522b2ce93cb6, sha256 355da601affba298898093c5d7143397c5be43f1c381aa9ed02c55a52789d940)
BibTeX
@misc{dc522b2ce93cb6,
  title = {Faster Verification of PJR$^+$ via Mincuts — arXiv:2609.20579},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20579},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_522b2ce93cb6; sha256 355da601affba298898093c5d7143397c5be43f1c381aa9ed02c55a52789d940},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20579. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

PJR$^+$ is a polynomial-time verifiable proportionality axiom for approval-based committee elections, but its known polynomial-time verification procedure relies on general submodular-function minimisation. We show that its objective is a maximum-closure problem and give a direct mincut formulation of the problem on a bipartite graph. Using an almost-linear-time maximum-flow algorithm, this yields an $\mathcal{O}(m(nk)^{1+o(1)})$-time verifier, where $n$, $m$, and $k$ are the numbers of voters, candidates, and committee members, respectively. The dependence of this bound on each parameter separately is almost linear: it is linear in $m$, and almost linear in $n$ and $k$. The verifier also returns an explicit group witnessing a violation and admits a slower but immediately implementable variant based on the preflow--push mincut algorithm. Finally, for the parameterised axiom $\alpha$-PJR$^+$, where $\alpha$ is used as a multiplier in the group size, we demonstrate how to compute the largest value of $\alpha$ for which a committee still fails the axiom using this mincut formulation.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20579 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T03:25:20.234Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).