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Finding a Positive Index Nash Equilibrium is PPADS-Complete — arXiv:2609.23879

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23879
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T06:58:08.410Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
926b44c91b9e1de46a66b8ab831b353d07afc7d934ed42acc9801fd57006895f
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How to cite

Finding a Positive Index Nash Equilibrium is PPADS-Complete — arXiv:2609.23879 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23879 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_51e1b0021990 (Metraipolis archive dc_51e1b0021990, sha256 926b44c91b9e1de46a66b8ab831b353d07afc7d934ed42acc9801fd57006895f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc51e1b0021990,
  title = {Finding a Positive Index Nash Equilibrium is PPADS-Complete — arXiv:2609.23879},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23879},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_51e1b0021990; sha256 926b44c91b9e1de46a66b8ab831b353d07afc7d934ed42acc9801fd57006895f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23879. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Every nondegenerate bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of Shapley index +1, since all equilibria are isolated, have index +1 or -1, and their indices sum to +1. We prove that the following promise search problem is PPADS-complete: given a rational bimatrix game promised to be nondegenerate, find an exact Nash equilibrium of index +1. The nondegeneracy promise can be removed if nonregular equilibria are also accepted: finding either a regular Nash equilibrium of index +1 or a nonregular Nash equilibrium in an arbitrary rational bimatrix game is also PPADS-complete. To our knowledge, this is the first PPADS-complete equilibrium search problem whose instances are explicit rational normal form payoff matrices, rather than succinct circuits or Turing machines, and thereby addresses an open question posed by Daskalakis [Daskalakis, 2019].

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computational Complexity (cs.CC) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23879 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T06:52:12.769Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).