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Multiplayer Stopping Games with a Conditionally Atomless Filtration — arXiv:2611.07184
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07184
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-06T14:51:56.359Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Multiplayer Stopping Games with a Conditionally Atomless Filtration — arXiv:2611.07184 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07184 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_51154b43bb36 (Metraipolis archive dc_51154b43bb36, sha256 7c69cef3148d28b388604aa8b503b56e15e0d0ebfe5c31de4016ba284b52ef6a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc51154b43bb36,
title = {Multiplayer Stopping Games with a Conditionally Atomless Filtration — arXiv:2611.07184},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07184},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_51154b43bb36; sha256 7c69cef3148d28b388604aa8b503b56e15e0d0ebfe5c31de4016ba284b52ef6a},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07184. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Stopping games are the multiplayer generalization of optimal stopping problems, in which each player independently chooses when to stop, and the payoff depends on who stops first and when. While the existence of $\varepsilon$-equilibria in two-player stopping games with integrable payoffs is known, the multiplayer case has remained open. We prove that every multiplayer stopping game in discrete time with integrable payoff process admits an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\varepsilon > 0$, provided the filtration is conditionally atomless. This condition is satisfied, in particular, when the underlying probability space is $\{0,1\}^{\dN}$ endowed with the uniform measure and its natural filtration. Our method also shows that every three-player stopping game, without the restriction to conditionally atomless filtration, admits an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\varepsilon > 0$. The proof combines techniques developed for two-player stopping games and for multiplayer quitting games, with a key new insight: the richness encoded in a conditionally atomless filtration can substitute for an external public randomization device, allowing players to coordinate without an explicit coordination signal.
Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.OC, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC) ; Probability (math.PR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07184 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-06T14:23:27.646Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).