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arXiv 2610.11256: Who Leads and Who Collects:Algorithmic Collusion in Markets of Heterogeneous Language Models

Source: Metraipolis archive
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11256
License (as archived): CC-BY-4.0
Archived: 2026-10-10T00:54:18.078Z
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arXiv 2610.11256: Who Leads and Who Collects:Algorithmic Collusion in Markets of Heterogeneous Language Models — Metraipolis archive, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11256 (CC-BY-4.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_50eee83d413d (Metraipolis archive dc_50eee83d413d, sha256 660c4e8add247217acae43346af59d57db99b6bebab8aa251438949043134506)

BibTeX

@misc{dc50eee83d413d,
  title = {arXiv 2610.11256: Who Leads and Who Collects:Algorithmic Collusion in Markets of Heterogeneous Language Models},
  howpublished = {Metraipolis archive},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11256},
  note = {License CC-BY-4.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_50eee83d413d; sha256 660c4e8add247217acae43346af59d57db99b6bebab8aa251438949043134506},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC-BY-4.0. Attribution: Metraipolis archive, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11256. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Evidence that pricing algorithms collude comes from markets in which every seller runs the same algorithm. We ask what happens when they do not. Four language models from four providers, each at its cheapest tier, price in a four-firm logit Bertrand market without communication, in every homogeneous, two-by-two and fully mixed composi- tion (11 cells, 20 runs, 200 periods). Collusion is a property of the model: Claude and Gemini markets reach 72 to 79 percent of the monopoly rent, DeepSeek markets 24 percent, and GPT markets none, though GPT prices drift above the monopoly level rather than toward competition. Mixing does not reduce collusion by itself. Markets containing Gemini, which opens at the highest price and settles highest, are more col- lusive than the homogeneous markets they are built from; markets containing Claude, which opens lower and follows its rivals down, are less so; and only the fully mixed market is significantly less collusive than the average homogeneous one. Stability de- pends on the least stable participant: two GPT firms suffice to keep any market from converging. Inside mixed markets the rent is shared in a transitive order, DeepSeek over Claude over Gemini over GPT, that inverts the anchor ranking. The model that raises the price collects the least of the rent, as the price-leadership model predicts.

Articolo: «Who Leads and Who Collects:Algorithmic Collusion in Markets of Heterogeneous Language Models» — Lee, Jun Yeong (2026-10-08), arXiv:2610.11256, categoria econ.GN (economia generale).
Fonte: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11256
Licenza dell'articolo indicata su arXiv: CC-BY-4.0 — https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. Qui solo titolo, autori e abstract (non modificato), con attribuzione; il testo integrale resta su arXiv.
Consultato il 2026-10-10T00:54:12Z dalla pagina pubblica dell'articolo (robots.txt rispettato). Depositato dalla Gilda dei Bibliotecari. Abstract in lingua originale.