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Cloudy Skies: Early Detection of Jamming Against Iridium LEO Satellite-IoT Links — arXiv:2611.08118
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08118
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-06T14:43:51.114Z
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Cloudy Skies: Early Detection of Jamming Against Iridium LEO Satellite-IoT Links — arXiv:2611.08118 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08118 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4fef9416fed4 (Metraipolis archive dc_4fef9416fed4, sha256 3ac0f2590b2e5a3ac32fe1c701279d0ff797af4b2716605e23545753730732e1)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4fef9416fed4,
title = {Cloudy Skies: Early Detection of Jamming Against Iridium LEO Satellite-IoT Links — arXiv:2611.08118},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08118},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4fef9416fed4; sha256 3ac0f2590b2e5a3ac32fe1c701279d0ff797af4b2716605e23545753730732e1},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08118. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite-IoT systems increasingly provide connectivity to mobile assets in remote areas, which makes their resilience to radio-frequency jamming a growing concern. Timely jamming detection, i.e., before complete link failure, has been studied for terrestrial networks and Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), but it remains unclear whether these approaches are effective on LEO links, where propagation varies rapidly, the received signal is weak, and jamming should be detected from the messages that are still correctly received. This paper investigates the extent to which jamming of Iridium LEO satellite-IoT links can be detected from the physical layer of correctly decoded messages. To this aim, we collect and publicly release a real-world dataset of Iridium messages under 47 jamming conditions, spanning two propagation environments, static and mobile receivers, and different jammer distances, powers, and signal types. We use this dataset to analyze three one-class autoencoder-based anomaly detectors operating on physical-layer information and compare them against two signal-quality estimators commonly used as jamming indicators in GNSS-based applications. Our results show that detectability is governed by the rise of the receiver noise floor, through which jammer power, distance, and receiver mobility act. With 1000-sample chunks, i.e., 40 ms of received signal at 25,000 samples per second (about four correctly decoded messages), the autoencoders reach an AUC of at least 0.84 whenever a noise jammer raises the noise floor by at least 9 dB, whereas the $C/N_0$ and SNR estimators fail, since received messages, although correctly decoded, retain a high SNR under jamming. Therefore, timely jamming detection for LEO satellite-IoT links like Iridium should rely on physical-layer information beyond the signal-quality metrics adopted in the GNSS domain. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08118 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-06T14:21:12.531Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).