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TEE Anchor: Cross-TEE Organizational Endorsement for Mitigating TEE Physical Attacks — arXiv:2609.35919

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35919
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T17:26:48.009Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
ae53a827f5169ccca3699ebe7069fd21477cbd7b89ca0f9d9aced0377cd12aef
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f84f85663ca

How to cite

TEE Anchor: Cross-TEE Organizational Endorsement for Mitigating TEE Physical Attacks — arXiv:2609.35919 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35919 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f84f85663ca (Metraipolis archive dc_4f84f85663ca, sha256 ae53a827f5169ccca3699ebe7069fd21477cbd7b89ca0f9d9aced0377cd12aef)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4f84f85663ca,
  title = {TEE Anchor: Cross-TEE Organizational Endorsement for Mitigating TEE Physical Attacks — arXiv:2609.35919},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35919},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f84f85663ca; sha256 ae53a827f5169ccca3699ebe7069fd21477cbd7b89ca0f9d9aced0377cd12aef},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35919. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In 2025, practical physical-access attacks against TEEs, such as this http URL and Battering RAM, were disclosed, posing a serious threat to current TEEs. The more strictly the target machine is guarded, the harder such attacks are to mount. Residing under trusted management has therefore emerged as a new security requirement. Yet existing attestation cannot prove a machine's organizational affiliation. This leaves room for an attacker to pass off a physically accessible machine under their control as one operated in a legitimate environment. We propose TEE Anchor, a mechanism that mitigates physical attacks by proving which organization manages a machine. TEE Anchor is a lightweight, X.509-based design that needs no additional root of trust such as a (v)TPM. The organization issues a certificate over the Chip ID, a unique per-CPU identifier, forming its own PKI. A Verifier then proves affiliation by matching the Chip ID in the attestation evidence against that certificate. This outperforms (v)TPM-based prior work in operational cost and deployability, applies across major TEEs without vendor lock-in, and lets any organization assert affiliation independently of TEE vendors. We implemented a prototype and confirmed that all operations, including provisioning and verification, complete within a few milliseconds.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35919 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T16:58:17.319Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).