Metraipolis › archive › dc_4f2011c8867f

SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure — arXiv:2610.01756

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01756
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T11:55:01.392Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
98d29de09e773ccd5f219a3c63bfae15c5db6d218b79d96607c5eff248055a09
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f2011c8867f

How to cite

SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure — arXiv:2610.01756 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01756 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f2011c8867f (Metraipolis archive dc_4f2011c8867f, sha256 98d29de09e773ccd5f219a3c63bfae15c5db6d218b79d96607c5eff248055a09)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4f2011c8867f,
  title = {SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure — arXiv:2610.01756},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01756},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4f2011c8867f; sha256 98d29de09e773ccd5f219a3c63bfae15c5db6d218b79d96607c5eff248055a09},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01756. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Decentralized agent economies increasingly build a single task from protocols that were designed and secured separately. This creates a simple problem: a workflow can look correct at each step and still produce the wrong outcome. For example, a correct escrow may release payment on an authorized approval that provides little evidence that the delivered work actually satisfied the task. We systematize this problem across the full lifecycle of an agent task. Our study organizes security and economic requirements into 17 property families over six stages, with receipt soundness and completeness assessed separately. We examine 12 systems and standards, five reusable mechanism families, and four classical baselines. We introduce guarantee closure, a task-relative criterion for determining whether guarantees established at one stage remain available and constrain the later decisions that depend on them. We apply the criterion to controlled and native workflows, covering 840 matched executions and an exhaustive 11,648-case check over a finite objective-task domain. Our results expose recurring failures between verification and settlement, where conforming work can remain unaccepted or valid evidence can be ignored. Public records and model judgments further distinguish recorded approval from evidence of task conformance, while economic analysis identifies the report, penalty, and shared-error assumptions behind these guarantees. These findings show where end-to-end guarantees fail and what must be repaired to preserve them across the workflow.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.MA).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01756 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T10:17:30.577Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.MA/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).