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Attestable Audit: Property-Based Attestation for Proprietary Workloads without Artifact Disclosure — arXiv:2610.04480

Source: arXiv
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04480
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-06T05:29:46.506Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 16703226a269edc9582f37dccac55729a078ae2216030ca4f2295509b88e374a
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e59cd7fd9b2

How to cite

Attestable Audit: Property-Based Attestation for Proprietary Workloads without Artifact Disclosure — arXiv:2610.04480 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04480 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e59cd7fd9b2 (Metraipolis archive dc_4e59cd7fd9b2, sha256 16703226a269edc9582f37dccac55729a078ae2216030ca4f2295509b88e374a)

BibTeX

@misc{dc4e59cd7fd9b2,
  title = {Attestable Audit: Property-Based Attestation for Proprietary Workloads without Artifact Disclosure — arXiv:2610.04480},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04480},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e59cd7fd9b2; sha256 16703226a269edc9582f37dccac55729a078ae2216030ca4f2295509b88e374a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04480. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) prove the integrity of code and data to a remote peer through remote attestation: the TEE issues an attestation report by signing, with a hardware-bound key, its configuration information, including measurements (cryptographic digests) of the code loaded inside it. A verifier appraises the report by matching these measurements against reference values. When the measured artifact is proprietary, however, the verifier cannot derive the reference values itself: it can only confirm that something with a given measurement is running inside the TEE---not that the program behaves as expected---forcing full trust in the reference value provider. We propose an architecture that closes this gap without disclosing the artifact, composing two TEE workloads: attestable build (Hugenroth et al., 2025), which binds a source code digest to a build artifact measurement, and attestable audit (proposed in this paper), which binds the same source code digest to the verdicts of automated audits---fuzzing, static analysis, AI code auditing, formal methods---executed inside a TEE. Both are instances of Confidential Computing Proofs: TEE attestation viewed as a hardware-backed zero-knowledge proof. Chaining the two certificates lets the verifier conclude that the running artifact was built from source code satisfying the audited properties, without disclosing either the source code or the build artifact. A proof-of-concept implementation on Intel SGX with the Gramine Library OS, running the Bandit security analyzer on Python code, demonstrates the practicality of the approach.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04480 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:26:35.338Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).