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Protecting CPU AI On Edge TEEs: WebAssembly's Promise and Practical Challenges — arXiv:2610.12050

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12050
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T06:20:35.190Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
325f4bfbc83080eafa6415450caa04129ece122cfce12fafacf6f5a3957fcdb6
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e02c0ab98b5

How to cite

Protecting CPU AI On Edge TEEs: WebAssembly's Promise and Practical Challenges — arXiv:2610.12050 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12050 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e02c0ab98b5 (Metraipolis archive dc_4e02c0ab98b5, sha256 325f4bfbc83080eafa6415450caa04129ece122cfce12fafacf6f5a3957fcdb6)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4e02c0ab98b5,
  title = {Protecting CPU AI On Edge TEEs: WebAssembly's Promise and Practical Challenges — arXiv:2610.12050},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12050},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4e02c0ab98b5; sha256 325f4bfbc83080eafa6415450caa04129ece122cfce12fafacf6f5a3957fcdb6},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12050. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

AI models on edge hardware contain important intellectual property (IP), but an adversary can steal it when they achieve root access. Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) like Arm TrustZone protect against these Operating System (OS) level attacks. However, they are challenging to use. More precisely, it is difficult to run unaltered applications inside a TEE. This work presents a solution that allows the execution of unaltered AI models, compiled to WebAssembly, on the WebAssembly Micro Runtime (WAMR) in OP-TEE for Arm TrustZone. Additionally, this work provides an AI model distributor that encrypts the WebAssembly binary and places the encryption key in one of the device's fuses. This way, only the WAMR Trusted Application (TA) in OP-TEE can decrypt and execute the AI model. A thorough evaluation of our solution shows that it incurs an additional overhead of 22% in comparison to an application manually ported to OP-TEE, while also facilitating the execution of unaltered AI models with an additional inference latency of 6% without significant porting effort. Overall, there is a pressing need to safeguard the IP of AI models and this work shows that there is a real promise in WebAssembly, but there remain some practical challenges.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Software Engineering (cs.SE).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12050 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T05:50:00.916Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).